South Carolina Law Review
Volume 23

Issue 1

Article 12

1971

Constitutional Law-The Right of Confrontation and the Unruly
Defendant
James S. Eakes

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eakes, James S. (1971) "Constitutional Law-The Right of Confrontation and the Unruly Defendant," South
Carolina Law Review: Vol. 23 : Iss. 1 , Article 12.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Eakes: Constitutional Law-The Right of Confrontation and the Unruly Defe

COMMENTS
RIGHT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -THE
CONFRONTATION AND THE
UNRULY DEFENDANT*
Hence, today, as in Lin-co's time, a man may ask
"whether [this] nation or any nation, so conceived and
so dedicated can long endure." It cannot endure if the
nation falls short on the guarantees of liberty, justice,
and equality embodied in our founding documents. But
it also cannot endure if we allow our precious heritage
of ordered liberty to be ripped apart amid the sound
and Jury of our time. It cannot endure if in individual
cases the claims of social peace and order on the one
side and of personal liberty on the other cannot be
mutually resolved in the forum designated by the Constitution,'
I. INTRODUCToON
One of the basic constitutional rights is that of an accused
in a criminal proceeding to confront his accusers. This right
of confrontation dates from the earliest times in the history of
justice when the presence of the accused was an absolute
necessity.2 This right is still considered a valuable -safeguard,
and the principle that after the indictment there should be
nothing done in the accused's absence prevades the entire area
of criminal procedure. 3
The right is secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution which provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to be confronted with witnesses against him .... ."4 In
Pointer v. Texasr the Supreme Court made this sixth amendment right applicable to the states by incorporation into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.6 Prior to Pointer,
* Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct. 1057 (1970).
1. Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (1970).
2. See Note, Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict in
Felony Cases, 16 COLUM. L. IEv. 18 (1916).
3. 21 Am. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 271 (1965).
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. Accord, S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 18.
5. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

6. Id.
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the Court had held that this right was included in the fourteenth amendment 7 because it was a fundamental right "basic
in our system of jurisprudence."" By Supreme Court decision,
the right of confrontation has been held to be applicable to
juvenile proceedings. 9 The right of confrontation has also long
been protected by many state constitutions, statutes, and case
decisions. 10 This same protection is provided in federal courts
by Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at
every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the
jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence except as otherwise provided by these
rules."
The right of confrontation incorporates two basic purposes.12
The most important is the accused's right to cross-examine.
witnesses against him13 which has been extended to include
cross-examination of the witnesses for the defendant. 14 Another purpose still accorded some importance is the supposed
psychological advantage gained from forcing the witness to
give his testimony fact-to-face with the accused so that the
judge and the jury may decide from the demeanor of the
witness whether or not his testimony is credible.' 5
Although basically the same everywhere, the procedural
aspects of the right of confrontation vary slightly among jurisdictions.'( There is some controversy among jurisdictions over
whether or not the defendant can waive this constitutionally
protected right. The majority of state and federal courts prohibit waiver in capital cases,17 although a very few state courts
7. In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
8. Id. at 273.

9. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
10. 21 Am. Jun. 2d Criminal Law § 335 (1965). See Murray, The Power to

Expel a Criminal Defendant From His Own Trial: A Comparative View, 36

U. COLo. L. REv. 171 (1964).
11. FED. 1.Caim. P. 43 (1961). Accord, S.C. Cim CT. R. 35 (1952).

This

S.C. rule provides, as many American jurisdictions do, for the personal

presence of the accused at trial.
12. 21 Am. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 333 (1965). Accord. 20 S.C.L. R v.
512 (1968).
13. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
14. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or. 163, 269 P.2d 491 (1954).
15. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).

16. Basically, the right of confrontation applies in all capital cases and all
felony cases. State v. Atidnson, 40 S.C. 363, 18 S.E. 1021 (1893).
17. See Note, Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict in
Felony Cases, 16 COLum. L. REv. 18, 21-23 (1916).
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allow such a waiver.1 8 Most jurisdictions do permit waiver in

non-capital cases where the accused has voluntarily absented
himself from a trial in process. 19 In this context one of the
more perplexing problems faced by the courts in this area can
be seen: whether or not a defendant may "voluntarily" waive
his right to be present through unruly and contumacious con20
duct during trial proceedings.
While the defendant has the right to be present at and to
participate in his trial, this right must be weighed against the
duty of the court to preserve order during its proceedings:
The preservation of order, dignity, and decorum in the
court room is one of the duties of the court, to which
end it has ample power and in preserving order, dignity and decorum, the court has broad discretion. 21
A conflict between the accused's right of confrontation and the
requirement of order normally arises only when the defendant
becomes so disorderly that his expulsion from the courtroom is
a necessity in order for the proceedings to continue. This comment will examine which sanctions are available to a judge
for the purpose of controlling a contumacious defendant.
I.

ILLanois v.

Am

22

In Illinois v. AJlen the dilemma of what to do with an
unruly defendant was placed squarely before the United States
Supreme Court. Allen had been convicted in Cook County of
armed robbery and sentenced to serve ten to thirty years. During the progress of this trial, there were many instances of
Allen's obstreperous behavior. 23 He attempted to refuse court
appointed counsel, and during the voir dire examination of
jurors, his abusive language disrupted the proceedings. 2 4 The
defendant again became disorderly after a noon recess, 25 and
18. Id.

19. Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446 (1889).
20. See United States v. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. 773 (No. 14,923) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1868) ; People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E2d 556 (1956). These cases
upheld "voluntary" waiver through unruly conduct.

21. 23 C.J.S. Criina~l Law § 961 (1961).
22. 90 S. Ct. 1057 (1970).
23. 413 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1969).
24. All this time Allen used abusive language toward the trial judge. He
said, "' W hen I go out for lunchtime, you're [the judge] going to be a corpse
here.'" Id. at 233.
25. After the recess Allen stated, "'There's not going to be no trial either.
I'm going to sit here and you're going to talk and you can bring your shackles
out and straight jacket and put them on me and tape my mouth but it will do
no good because there's not going to be no trial."
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even during brief appearances for purposes of identification
during26the state's case-in-chief he used "vile and abusive" lan-

guage.

Because of such outbursts, the judge was forced to remove
Allen from the courtroom during the voir dire examination and
again during the presentation of the state's case. The judge
repeatedly warned the defendant that he would be removed if
his improper conduct continued. After assurance of proper
conduct, Allen was allowed to return to the trial. He remained
present for the rest of the trial which included his defense and
27
the rendition of the verdict.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convic2
tion. 28 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari 9;
a federal district court subsequently denied a writ of habeas
corpus which alleged that Allen had been deprived of his constitutional right of confrontation. 0 On appeal the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the federal district court's

decision.3 1
The court of appeals rejected the Illinois Supreme Court's
contention that there had been a "voluntary" waiver of Allen's
right to confrontation. 32 They held that a defendant in a
criminal trial has the "unqualified" right to remain present at
all stages of his trial.33 Thus, Allen had been forced to waive
a constitutionally protected "absolute" right:
No conditions may be imposed on the absolute right of
a criminal defendant to be present at all stages of the
proceedings. The insistence of a defendant that he
exercise this right under unreasonable conditions does
not amount to a waiver. Such conditions, if insisted
upon, should and must be dealt with in a manner that
34
does not compel the relinquishment of his right.
Acknowledging Allen's disruptive behavior, the court of appeals further stated that "[tihe proper course for the trial
26. Id.
27. Id.

28. People v. Allen, 37 Ill. 2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1(1967).

29. Allen v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 907 (1967).

30. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F2d 232 (1969).
31. Id. See generally 23 VAND. L. REv. 431 (1970).
32. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 235 (1969).

33. Id.
34. Id. at 235. In this decision the court relied upon Hopi v. Utah, 110
U.S. 574 (1888), and Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583 (1923), plus the
constitutional mandate of the sixth amendment
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judge was to have restrained the defendant by whatever means
necessary, even if those means included his being shackled and
gagged."3 5
Upon review of the Allen case by the United States Supreme
Court, Mr. Justice Black, for the majority, stated:
[W]e explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose
his right to be present at trial if, after he has been
warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists
on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive and disrespectful of the court that his trial
cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. 36
In so ruling, the Court held that the broad dicta of Hopt vo.
UtaA3 7 and Lewis v. United States38 that a trial cannot proceed
in the defendant's absence had been overruled by Diaz v. United
States.39 In Diaz it was pointed out that both Lewis and Ropt
concerned an accused who was in custody, charged with a capital offense, and sentenced to death. Their absence at certain
stages of their trials had not actually been voluntary. In Diaz
the accused had been charged with a homicide, not capital, and
was free on bail. On two occasions, he had voluntarily absented himself from the trial and consented that it proceed in
his absence in the presence of his lawyer. None of these cases
involved an unruly defendant.
Thus, following the reasoning of "voluntary" waiver in Diaz,
the Allen Court explicitly held that an unruly defendant could
be expelled from his own trial. As Mr. Justice Cardozo had
35. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F2d 232, 235 (1969).

36. Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (1970).
37. 110 U.S. 574 (1884). The defendant during his trial had failed to object
when part of the trial was conducted in his absence. It was held that through
his silence he had consented. The Supreme Court disagreed and stated: "That
which the law makes essential in proceedings involving the deprivation of
life and liberty cannot be dispensed with or affected by the consent of the
accused, much less by his mere failure, when on trial and in custody, to object
to unauthorized methods." Id. at 579.

38. 146 U.S. 370 (1892). In this case the defendant was not able to face

the jurors until after they had been chosen. He accepted the manner in which
the challenges had been made at the time, and the Supreme Court ruled this
was an essential part of the trial, and the prisoner had the right to confront
the jurors at this time.
39. 223 U.S. 442 (1912). The Court in Diaz, speaking of the defendant,
stated that if he voluntarily absented himself from the trial that "this does not
nullify what has been done or prevent the completion of the trial, but, on the
contrary, operates as a waiver of his right to be present, and leaves the court
free to proceed with the trial in like manner and with effect as if he were
present." Id. at 455.
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stated in an earlier decision: "No doubt the privilege may be
lost by consent or at times even by misconduct.140
III. SANCTIONS A JUDGE MAY USE

In the Allen case, the court recognized that there must be
some reliable methods by which a judge can control an obstreperous defendant. 41 In a concurring opinion 4 2 Mr. Justice
Brennan quoted a principle first stated in Falk v. UB.4 3 In
Falk the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, while
affirming a guilty verdict rendered after the accused had fled
the jurisdiction, stated:
It does not seem to us to be consonant with the dictates of common sense that an accused person... should
be at liberty, whenever he pleases,... to break up a trial
already commenced. The practical result of such a
proposition, if allowed to be law, would be to prevent
any trial whatever until the accused person himself
should be pleased to permit it ....

This would be a

travesty of justice which could not be tolerated .... [W]e
do not think that any rule of law or constitutional principle leads us to any conclusion that would be so disasterous as well to the administration of justice as to the
true interests of civil liberty ....
The question is one of broad public policy, whether an
accused person, placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the safeguards with which the humanity of
our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him,
can with impunity defy the processes of that law,
paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries and turn
them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society,
for its own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle of personal liberty. Neither in criminal nor in
40. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1938). In this case Snyder
and another were sentenced to be put to death for their part in an attempted
robbery which had led to a murder. At the trial and on appeal Snyder had
claimed that the trial judge's refusal to permit him to be present at a view of
the scene of the crime had been a denial of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari. While affirming Snyder's conviction, Mr. Justice Cardozo,
who delivered the opinion for the court, stated: "So far as the Fourteenth
Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due
process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his
absence, and to that extent only." Id. at 107-08.
41. Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct. 1057 (1970).
42. Id. at 1063-64.
43. Falk v. United States, 15, App. D.C. 446 (1899).
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-civil cases will the law allow a person to take advantage
44
of his own wrong.

W6rking from such a premise, the Allen Court decided that
there were three constitutionally permissible methods for controlling an obstreperous defendant: (1) binding and gagging
the defendant; (2) use of the contempt power; and (3) removal
of the defendant. The trial judge, by using the method best
suited to the situation, can control the proceedings of a trial.
A. Binding and Gagging

The Allen Court felt that binding and gagging the defendant
was the least satisfactory method available. 45 Although such
a course of action satisfies the requirement of the defendant's
presence, it is a repulsive technique and could prejudice the
jury toward the defendant. 4 6 Other disadvantages are that it
is repulsive to the very decorum and dignity of judicial proceedings and to the inherent dignity of the human being. 47 The

defendant would also be unable to communicate effectively with
his attorney, one of the reasons for his presence. 48 The door
was, however, left open in Allen so that this sanction might be
used where necessary in some future situation.49 This method
has been used and is still upheld under some circumstances.
The case of United States v. Bentvena5° involved a conspir-

acy trial with fourteen defendants. During the trial, two of
the defendants -were ordered shackled and gagged after one had
climbed into the jurors' box and pushed some jurors around
and the other had thrown a chair at the Assistant United States
Attorney. 5 ' The judge's action was upheld on the ground that
he had not abused his discretion.5 2
In People v. Kerrnidge 3 the defendant had caused several
disturbances. He had attempted to leave the courtroom when
his case 'was called and had later attempted to remain undressed
in his cell.54 After having been pronounced competent by a
44. Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct 1057, 1064 (1970), quoting from Diaz v. U.S.,
223 U.S. 442, 457-558 (1912) which quoted from Falk v. U.S., 15 App. D.C
446, 454, and 460 (1899).
45. 90 S. Ct. at 1061.
46. 21 Am. Jura 2d Criminal Law § 240 (1965).
47. 90 S. Ct. at 1061.
48. 21 Am. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 240 (1965).
49. 90 S. Ct. at 1061.
50. 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963).
51. Id. at 931.
52. Id. at 930.
53. 20 Micl. App. 184, 173 N.W.2d 789 (1969).
54. 173 N.W.2d at 789.
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psychiatrist, 55 the defendant was ordered strapped in his chair
and was later gagged when he used vile and abusive language. 50
57
The defendant was freed after a promise of good behavior,
s
and the action of the trial judge was upheld even in the face
of a Michigan statute which states that a defendant may not be
tried for a felony in his absence. 9
The trial judge's decision was again upheld in People v.
ReynoZd.60 Here the judge ordered the defendant strapped to
his chair because of a series of outbursts which the defendant
directed at witnesses proclaiming his innocence.0 1
The case of Seale v. Hoffm410 2 deals with one of the best

known trials concerning the binding and gagging of a defendant.63 It is better known as the trial of the "Chicago
Seven." During this trial Bobby Seale through his abusive and
vile language, directed usually toward Judge Julius J. Hoffman, brazenly attempted to make a shambles of the criminal
judicial process in an effort to force a mistrial.0 4 The record of
the trial indicated that on the first instance of gagging only
one-half hour's evidence had been taken in one afternoon because of Seale's outbursts. 65 The District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that the case could be dismissed upon
jurisdictional grounds. 66 However the court went on to say:
While a defendant in a criminal case has an absolute
right to be present during his trial, he does not have a
right to brazenly make a shambles of the criminal judicial process and attempt to force a mistrial ....
[Tihe
record is clear that Seale unequivocally refused to conform his conduct with the minimal requirements of
courtroom order and decorum. Instead, he stood in
open defiance of the court's authority. No other remedy
67
was available to the trial judge.
55. 173 N.W2d at 791.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. See also People v. Duplissey, 380 Mich. 100, 155 N.W.2d 850
(1968); People v. Thomas, 1 Mich. App. 118, 134 N.W.2d 352 (1965).
59. Id.
60. 20 Mich. App. 397, 174 N.W.2d 25 (1969).
61. Id.

62. 306 F. Supp. 330 (1969).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

United States v. David T. Dellinger et al., 69 CR 180.
306 F. Supp. 330, 332 (1969).
Id.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 333.
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B. Contempt Power
The contempt power is another alternative within the judge's
discretion. 8 It is, however, obvious that the contempt power
will not always be effective. Citing a defendant for contempt
has obvious limitations where he faces capital punishment or a
long prison term.0 9 This would also be true in the case of a
martyr or a defendant wishing to use the courtroom as a forum
for expression of a political viewpoint7 0 The contempt power
it
should be used in cases where it will be effective 7because
1
satisfies the requirements of procedural due process. '
Closely related to the contempt remedy is the judge's power
to imprison an unruly defendant for civil contempt until he
gives assurances of proper conduct.7 2 This also has obvious
limitations as a remedy, since the defendant might attempt
through a prison sentence to cause the unavailability of a vital
witness. Yet, where feasible, it will satisfy the confrontation
requirement and prevent the unpleasant necessity of shackling
7 4
and gagging.7 3 In the recent decisions of Duncan v. Louisiana
and Cheff v. Schnaekenberg" the judge's power to sentence for
contempt was limited to six months. 7 6 Thus, the civil contempt
77
power also would only be effective in certain situations.
('.

Remwval

Removal of the defendant appears to be the most equitable
sanction in many cases. It was ruled in AlZen that it is within
the discretion of the trial judge to exclude a defendant from
his own trial after warning him that any more disruptions will
result in his expulsion.7 8 This is not a new concept; it was
68. 17 Am. Jim. 2d Contempt §§ 2, 3, 4 (1965). Accord, State v. Weinberg, 229 S.C. 286, 92 S.E.2d 842 (1956).
69. Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (1970). See Note, Unruly Criminal Defendants Disrupting Court Proceedings: Right of the Court to Remove,
Gag, or Shackle Defendants Versus Right of Defendants to be Present at
and Participatein Their Trial, 6 WAxE FoRE T INTRA. L. Rxv. 499 (1970).

70. Id.

71. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.

72. Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct 1057, 1062 (1970).

73. Id.
74. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
75. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
76. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg,
384 U.S. 373 (1966).
77. Illinois v. Allen, 90 S.Ct 1057, 1062 (1970). See generally, Comment,
Dealing With Unruly Persons in the Courtroom, 48 N.C. L. Ray. 878, 886-95
(1970).
78. 90 S. Ct. at 1062-63.
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initially used by the Supreme Court of Illinois but was later
rejected by the court of appeals in the Allen case.
Expulsion was also used in an early English case where a
defendant on trial for a misdemeanor so misbehaved that she
was excluded from her trial.79 She was then tried, convicted,
and sentenced in her absence. This procedure was held to be
valid. 0
Some courts use the rationale of "voluntary" waiver in order
to justify the expulsion of the defendant. There are two early
cases which appear to support the Supreme Court of Illinois
in this reasoning."' In United States v. Davis82 the defendant
was removed from the courtroom because he insisted on interrupting the district attorney 8 3 After holding that an obstreperous defendant could be removed for disrupting the trial, the
court stated: "It does not lie in his mouth [the defendant's] to
complain of the order which was made necessary by his own
misconduct ..... 84 It was also pointed out that the defendant
could have alleviated the situation by manifesting an intention
to cease his disturbances.8 5
The defendant in PeopZe v. DeSimone8 had caused disorder
by directing profane language at the jurors and by destroying
an exhibit already accepted into evidence.8 7 The court used
the "voluntary" absence reasoning and held that his right of
confrontation under the Illinois constitution could be waived by
such a "voluntary act."8 8 In other words, he had knowledge
that continued misconduct would result in his removal. By
voluntarily continuing the disruptive activity, he "voluntarily"
waived his right.
The reasoning of a voluntary waiver because of continued
misconduct was the same used by the Illinois Supreme Court 0
79. Rex v. Mary Browne, 70 J.P. 472 (Eng., Cent. Crim. Ct., Sept. 14,

1906).

80. Id.
81. People v. Allen, 37 Ill. 2d 167, 226 N.E2d 1 (1967). See Murray, The
Power to Expel a Criminal Defendant From His Owzn Trial: A Comparative
View, 36 U. COLO. L. Rv. 171, 173-74 (1964).
82. 25 Fed. Cas. 773 (No. 14,923) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 774.
85. Id.
86. 9 Ill.
2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
87. 138 N.E2d at 563. The court stated: "The right to appear and defend
is not given to a defendant [for] the right to prevent trial ...
88. Id.
89. People v. Allen, 37 Ill.
2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1 (1967).
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which was later rejected by the court of appeals.9 0 Under the
Supreme Court's decision in Allen, this is again a proper rationale to use to justify explusion of an unruly defendant.

IV.

PoLmcAL TRiAmS

Mr. Justice Douglas agreed with the majority in Allen that
"[a] courtroom is a hallowed place where trials must proceed
with dignity ..... "I However, he disagreed that Allen was a
proper case in which "to establish the appropriate guidelines for
92
judicial control."
He gave two types of cases which will or could be directly
affected by the guidelines set forth in Allen. The first class are
those political in nature. (In a footnote he cited examples of
trials of a political nature. These included cases involving the
Haymarket riot, the Pullman strike, the copper strikes of 1917,
the Red Scare, and an agreement to teach Marxism.) 93 Noting
that these political cases occur periodically in history, Mr. Justice Douglas felt that there was a danger that the courts might
overstep their broad supervisory power and infringe upon the
accused's right to confrontation. He felt that problems of this
nature should be solved only when a political trial reached the
Court; that is, in a factually appropriate case, not on an inadequate record.95
The second type of trial mentioned by Mr. Justice Douglas is
that created when radicals on the left attempt to destroy the
constitutional system by disrupting the orderly judicial process.
He stated that the Allen guidelines were premature in this
instance also.9 6
Mr. Justice Douglas felt that the record of the Allen case was
inadequate to answer the questions raised by poltical trials and
trials "used by minorities to destroy the existing constitutional
system." He stated:
I would not try to provide in this case the guidelines
for those two strikingly different types of cases. The
90. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F2d 232 (7th Cir. 1969).
91. 90 S. Ct. at 1065.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1065.

94. Id. at 1065-67. He used as an example the trial of William Penn. Penn
was tried in London in 1670 on charges of causing a riot while all that he did
was preach a sermon on Grace Street after his church had been closed down
by the Coventicle Act. At the conclusion of the trial, Penn was acquitted by
the jury, but he was jailed for his contemptuous conduct.
95. 90 S. Ct. at 1065.
96. Id. at 1067.
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case presented here is the classical criminal case without any political or subversive overtones. It involves a
defendant who was a sick person and who may or may
not have been insane in the classical sense but who apparently had a diseased mind. And, as I have said, the
record is so stale that it is now much too late to find
97
out what the true facts really were.
IV. CoNcrusIoN

Recently there has been an evident, growing need on the part
of the courts of this nation for the sanctions clarified by the
Allen court. There have been an increasing number of trials
which have been disrupted through the contemptuous conduct
of unruly defendants, riotous spectators, and others. To give a
few examples: In the recent trial of the "Chicago Seven" contemptuous conduct reached a new height; the trial of Black
Panthers in New York, with indictments ranging from bombings to possession of unlawful weapons, was disrupted many
times by obscene and disruptive language directed toward Justice John Murtagh and which even erupted several times into an
open brawl; Justice Murtagh was forced by these actions to
suspend the trial. Recently in another Chicago trial, in which
eleven students of the University of Illinois were charged in
connection with a campus disturbance in May, a circuit courtroom was thrown into turmoil. Police and court officials had to
battle the defendants and unruly spectators and finally had to
resort to chemical mace to gain control of the situation. The
trial was postponed because of possible prejudice, and contempt
98
sentences were handed out.
Many recent examples of courtrooms in turmoil can be
gathered from newspaper and magazine accounts. It was because of such situations that the guidelines set forth in Allen
became a necessity. These sanctions provide a workable frame97. Id.
98. The most recent trial in which a judge has used the expulsion sanction
is that of Charles Manson and his three women followers in the Sharon Tate
murder trial. They were ejected twice in one week for singing and shouting
insults at the judge. The most recent expulsion came when Mason repeatedly
disrupted proceedings after Superior Court Judge Charles H. Older had repeatedly warned him to be quiet. Suddenly Mason dived at the judge with a
sharpened pencil shouting "I'm going to fight for my life," and as he was
subdued had said "In the name of Christian justice, someone should cut your
head off." The three women were ejected along with Manson when they
began an unintelligible chant. The defendants were sent to detention rooms
where they could listen to the proceedings via loudspeakers. The State
(Columbia, S.C.) Oct. 6, 1970, at 1, col. 7.
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work within which a judge can preserve the order and dignity
of the courtroom in the face of a disruptive defendant. Even
though the right of confrontation is an important procedural
safeguard, the defendant cannot be allowed to become so disorderly that he destroys the trial proceedings. A society founded
in freedom cannot exist if the judicial system upon which it is
based cannot survive. The judicial system must be allowed to
do justice despite the defendant's conduct. There must be a
reasonable balance struck between the needs of an ordered society and the safeguards with which it surrounds the accused.
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